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Abstract
Frequent key changes are must in order to limit the amount of data compromised. Cryp-
tography simply can not get off the ground without effective key distribution mecha-
nism.Several key agreement protocols are proposed on password based mechanism. These
protocols are vulnerable to dictionary attacks. Traditional 3-party key agreement prot-
cols are vulnerable to insider attacks and server becomes a monitoring centre which we
dont want in most of the applications.EKE protocol is vulnerable to Denning -Sacco at-
tacks. EKE demands storing clear text version of password on server which is always
not possible. STW protocol was proved to be vulnerable to on-line and off-line guessing
attacks as it lacks server authentication to hosts. LSH 3-PEKE uses server public keys
but its not an optimistic solution.the approach of using server public keys is not always
a satisfactory solution and is impractical for some environments. Communication parties
have to obtain and verify the public key of the server, a task which puts a high burden
on the user. SAKA protocol has got limited applications as it is a 2-party protocol.
In proposed protocol trusted third party (key Distribution server) mediates in key
distribution. Rather than storing clear text version of password one way hash of the
password is stored at the server. Every host and server agree upon family of commutative
hash functions using which host authenticates itself to server when it applies for session
key . During this protocol run host establishes one time key with server using which
server also authenticates to host. This defeats man-in-the middle attacks.Diffie-Hellman
protocol serves as basis for this protocol. It is secure against dictionary attacks as we
use one time keys with server. It is also secure against malaicious insider attacks (host
misuses the information in one protocol run to another)since we use one time keys. It
also provides perfect forward secrecy i.e. even if one key is disclosed future session keys
will not be disclosed. Moreover we don’t use any public key infrastructure which needs
large computational power. In this protocol server acts just like a authentication server
not like a monitoring server. This protocol is also immune to off-line and on-line guessing
attacks as there is no verifiable information is present.
Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
”A hundred ounces of silver spent for information may save ten thousand
spent on war”.
By Sun-Tzu[Chinese general fourth century B.C]
Information is a ”quality” of a message that is sent from a sender to one or more receivers.
Information is the state of a system of interest (curiosity). Message is the information Ma-
terialized.Information security deals with several different ”trust” aspects of information.
Another common term is information assurance. Information security is not confined to
computer systems, or to information in an electronic or machine-readable form. It ap-
plies to all aspects of safeguarding or protecting information or data, in whatever form.
The concepts, techniques, technical measures, and administrative measures used to pro-
tect information assets from deliberate or inadvertent unauthorized acquisition, damage,
disclosure, manipulation, modification, loss, or use.
I
¯
nformation security is defined as the protection of information systems against unau-
thorized access to or modification of information, whether in storage, processing or tran-
sit, and against the denial of service to authorized users or the provision of service to
unauthorized users, including those measures necessary to detect, document, and counter
such threats. Because today’s economy depends on the secure flow of information within
and across an organization, information security is an issue of vital importance. A secure
and trusted Environment for stored and shared information greatly enhances consumer
benefits, business performance and productivity, and national security. Conversely, an
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insecure environment creates the potential for serious damage to governments and cor-
porations that could significantly undermine consumers and citizens.
For firms engaged in critical activities, such as electrical power generation, banking and
finance, or healthcare, the stakes are particularly high. Integral to all security programs
whether for an asset or an entire agency is a risk assessment process that includes deter-
mining the level of sensitivity of information and systems. As the technological revolution
has progressed throughout society, an increasing amount of ’valuable’ data is stored or
transported in the form of electronic binary sequences. This has lead to an extremely
efficient and sophisticated environment, with the rate of information exchange reaching
incomprehensible limits. Organizations have finally grasped the concept of Information
Technology, and now see that by effectively applying it, they are increasing business pros-
perity. Inevitably, this has lead to greater dependence on IT on the part of the firms.
As we all know, we do not live in a perfect environment, and with access to such
informational power via the networks, there is bound to be an increasing amount of
hacking. So, with a variety of organizations depending on their computer systems, the
cost of this type of crime could be extremely high, both in terms of time and money.
The other main disadvantage is the need for extremely expensive hardware leading to
an increased number of physical thefts. It is these fundamental problems that have
brought about the need for security. It is an important point that information security
is, inherently and necessarily, neither hermetic nor watertight nor perfectible. No one
can ever eradicate all risk of improper or capricious use of any information.
1.1 ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION SECURITY
Three widely accepted elements (aims, principles, qualities, characteristics, attributes) of
information security are:
Confidentiality :
Confidentiality has been defined by the International Organization for Standardization
(ISO) as ”ensuring that information is accessible only to those authorized to have access”
and is one of the cornerstones of Information security. Confidentiality is one of the design




In computer science and telecommunications, the term data integrity has the following
meanings:
• The condition in which data are identically maintained during any operation, such
as transfer, storage, and retrieval.
• The preservation of data for their intended use.
• Relative to specified operations, the apriori expectation of data quality.
Another aspect of data integrity is the assurance that data can only be accessed and




Availability has the following meaning:
• The degree to which a system, subsystem, or equipment is operable and in a com-
mittable state at the start of a mission, when the mission is called for at an un-
known, i.e., a random, time. Simply put, availability is the proportion of time a
system is in a functioning condition. The conditions determining operability and
commutability must be specified.availability is Expressed mathematically, as one
minus the unavailability. A simple way to express this is ”the right information to
the right people at the right time”.
1.2 LAYOUT OF THESIS
As part of this thesis in Chapter-1 need for Information security,Elements of Information
security are discussed. In Chapter-2, key distribution,Design goals of key agreement pro-
tocols,possible attacks are discussed. In Chapter-3 , traditional 2-Party authentication,2-
Party key distribution and 3-party key distribution protocols[7] are discussed. 2-party key
3
agreement protocols like Diffie-Hellman protocol [10], Encrypted key exchange protocol
(EKE)[5] ,Simple Authenticated Key Agreement protocol [1] are discussed in Chapter-4.
3-party Key agreement protocols , STW protocol [13], LSH-3 Party EKE [2] are discussed
in Chapter-5. In Chapter-6, new 3-party key agreement protocol which is secure against
masquerading and dictionary attacks is proposed. In Chapter-7 conclusion and scope of





The main goal of cryptography is to enable secure communication in a hostile environ-
ment. Two parties, Pi a
¯
nd Pj ,want to safely communicate over a network occupied by an
active adversary. Usually, Pi a
¯
nd Pj will want to ensure the privacy and authenticity of
the data they send to each other. They will encrypt and authenticate their transmissions.
But before Pi a
¯
nd Pj can use these tools they will need to have keys. Indeed, without
keys, cryptography simply cannot get off the ground. Key agreement is one of the fun-
damental cryptographic primitive after encryption and digital signature. Such protocols
allow two or more parties to exchange information among themselves over an adversarially
controlled insecure network and agree upon a common session key, which may be used
for later secure communication among the parties. Thus, secure key agreement protocols
serve as basic building block for constructing secure, complex, higher-level protocols. Key
establishment may be broadly subdivided into key transport and key agreement.
S
¯
ecret communications with secret keys implies that only trusted parties should have
copies of the secret key. Although secret keys can assure us of confidentiality,authentication
of users, and message integrity, in a global world we must be able to securely distribute
keys at a distance in a timely manner [19]. If security is to be maintained, key distri-
bution must be as solid as the cryptographic method and must be able to ensure that
only trusted parties have copies of the keys. Obviously, key distribution is a significant
problem. Key establishment protocols involving authentication typically require a set-up
phase whereby authentic and possibly secret initial keying material is distributed. Most
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protocols have as an objective the creation of distinct keys on each protocol execution.
In some cases,the initial keying material pre-defines a fixed key which will result every
time the protocol is executed by a given pair or group of users. Systems involving such
static keys are insecure under known-key attacks.
K
¯
ey pre-distribution schemes are key establishment protocols whereby the resulting
established keys are completely determined a priori by initial keying material. In contrast,
dynamic key establishment schemes are those whereby the key established by a Fixed pair
(or group) of users varies on subsequent executions. Dynamic key establishment is also
referred to as session key establishment. In this case the session keys are dynamic, and
it is usually intended that the protocols are immune to known-key attacks. Many key
establishment protocols involve a centralized or trusted party, for either or both initial
system setup and on-line actions (i.e., involving real-time participation). This party
is referred to by a variety of names depending on the role played, including: trusted
third party, trusted server, authentication server, key distribution center (KDC), key
translation center (KTC), and certification authority.
I
¯
t is generally desired that each party in a key establishment protocol be able to
determine the true identity of the other(s) which could possibly gain access to the resulting
key, implying preclusion of any unauthorized additional parties from deducing the same
key. In this case, the technique is said (informally) to provide secure key establishment.
This requires both secrecy of the key and identification of those parties with access to it.
2.1 DEFINITIONS
• Protocol :
protocol is a multi-party algorithm, defined by a sequence of steps precisely spec-
ifying the actions required of two or more parties in order to achieve a specified
objective.
• Key establishment :
Key establishment is a process or protocol where by a shared secret becomes avail-
able to two or more parties, for subsequent cryptographic use.
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• Key transport protocol :
key transport protocol or mechanism is a key establishment technique where one
party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the
other(s).
• Key agreement protocol :
key agreement protocol or mechanism is a key establishment technique in which
a shared secret is derived by two (or more) parties as a function of information
contributed by, or associated with, each of these, (ideally) such that no party can
predetermine the resulting value.
• Key distribution system :
KDS is a method whereby, during an initialization stage, a trusted server generates
and distributes secret data values (pieces) to users, such that any pair of users may
subsequently compute a shared key unknown to all others (aside from the server).
2.2 MOTIVATION FOR USE OF SESSION KEYS
Key establishment protocols result in shared secrets which are typically called, or used
to derive, session keys. Secret keys are not secure forever. They can be stolen, lost, for-
gotten, destroyed,stored in insecure ways, or copied without authorization [16]. A secret
key that has been used many times probably hides more secrets than a secret key that
has been used only once. An adversary is more likely to go after the secret key that has
been used many times. Ideally, a session key is an ephemeral secret, i.e., one whose use
is restricted to a short time period such as a single telecommunications connection (or
session), after which all trace of it is eliminated [17].
Motivation for ephemeral keys includes the following:
• To limit available cipher text (under a fixed key) for cryptanalytic attack.
• To limit exposure, with respect to both time period and quantity of data, in the
event of (session) key compromise.
• To avoid long-term storage of a large number of distinct secret keys (in the case
where one terminal communicates with a large number of others), by creating keys
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only when actually required
• To create independence across communication sessions or applications. It is also
desirable in practice to avoid the requirement of maintaining state information
across sessions.
2.3 DESIGN GOALS
Before turning to the construction of the actual protocols,we emphasize the goals of design
and desired properties of the resulting protocols:
• Simplicity
Simplicity is the major theme in the design and its foremost intended feature. The
simpler the protocol, the easier it is to spot vulnerabilities and to demonstrate
security features.
• No timetamps
Use of timestamps in authentication and key distribution protocols has been de-
bated ad nauseum for a number of years. Since our concern is with simplicity,
timestamps are unacceptable because of the inherent requirement for (even loose)
clock synchronization [19].
• Small number of cryptographic operations
Cryptography is essential but must be used sparingly. Minimizing the use of cryp-
tography makes protocols simpler and more efficient.
• Small message sizes
Small message sizes can make a protocol suitable for implementation in space-
conscious environments, e.g., in a network layer” or in a boot service. Another
incentive is to eliminate unnecessary redundancy which can otherwise make a pro-
tocol less secure and/or less efficient.
• Small number of messages
Similarly, too many messages make an awkward protocol. Few messages make




The merits of public key cryptography are many and well known. However, it is
still quite inefficient. Furthermore its use sometimes presents a problem because of
the associated patent issues. Finally, most public key methods impose a fairly large
basic encryption block size (e.g., 512 bits is a recommended minimum for RSA.).
Nonetheless, for the sake of generality, the resulting protocols must not have any
features that rule out the use of public key cryptography.
• No decryption
A typical cryptosystem has two components: encryption and decryption. While the
use of encryption is necessary there are reasons to avoid using decryption. First,
decryption makes the implementation more complex. Second, it rules out the use
of strong one-way hash functions in place of traditional encryption techniques (and
where only encryption is needed, strong one-way hash functions can be used instead
at much lower cost).
• Minimal overhead
The key distribution protocol we intend to construct should impose minimal ad-
ditional overhead on the existing authentication protocol it is based on. Since the
authentication protocol used as building block is a generic one, we abstract out the
specifics of the underlying encryption function.
• Key Non-Disclosure
A third party cannot discover a key being distributed without explicit collaboration
of a legitimate party. Legitimate party is one of the two protocol participants.
• Key Non-Modification
a third party cannot modify a key being distributed to any value known to this
third party.
• Key Non-Reuse
A third party cannot distribute a previously used key, i.e., it cannot fool the ini-
tiating party into using an old key(This can be considered a subset of the Key
Non-Modification property).
• Key Independence
Knowledge of one key cannot be used to compute other keys, i.e., a key distributed
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in one protocol run does not open the door to discovering keys distributed in other
protocol runs.
2.4 ADVERSARIES IN KEY ESTABLISHMENT PRO-
TOCOLS
To clarify the threats protocols may be subject to, and to motivate the need for specific
protocol characteristics, one requires (as a minimum) an informal model for key establish-
ment protocols, including an understanding of underlying assumptions. Attention here
is restricted to two-party protocols, although the definitions and models may be gener-
alized. Communicating parties or entities in key establishment protocols are formally
called principals,and assumed to have unique names. In addition to legitimate parties,
the presence of an unauthorized third party is hypothesized, which is given many names
under various circumstances, including: adversary, intruder, opponent, enemy, attacker,
eavesdropper,and impersonator. When examining the security of protocols, it is assumed
that the underlying cryptographic mechanisms used, such as encryption algorithms and
digital signatures schemes,are secure. If otherwise, then there is no hope of a secure pro-
tocol. An adversary is hypothesized to be not a cryptanalyst attacking the underlying
mechanisms directly, but rather one attempting to subvert the protocol objectives by de-




passive attack involves an adversary who attempts to defeat a cryptographic tech-
nique by simply recording data and thereafter analyzing it (e.g., in key establishment,
to determine the session key). An active attack involves an adversary who modifies or
injects messages. It is typically assumed that protocol messages are transmitted over un-
protected (open) networks, modeled by an adversary able to completely control the data
therein, with the ability to record, alter, delete, insert, redirect, re-order, and reuse past
or current messages,and inject new messages. An active adversary attacks the network.
Adversary can start up entirely new instances of players. Adversary may acquire session
keys and corrupt players themselves. In the face of such a powerful adversary secure
session key distribution is only possible when Pi a
¯
nd Pj have some information advan-
tage over the adversary. To emphasize this, legitimate parties are modeled as receiving
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messages exclusively via intervening adversaries (on every communication path, or on
some subset of t of n paths), which have the option of either relaying messages unaltered
to the intended recipients, or carrying out (with no noticeable delay) any of the above
actions.An adversary may also be assumed capable of engaging unsuspecting authorized
parties by initiating new protocol executions.An adversary in a key establishment protocol
may pursue many strategies, including attempting to:
• Deduce a session key using information gained by eavesdropping.
• Participate covertly in a protocol initiated by one party with another, and influence
it,e.g., by altering messages so as to be able to deduce the key.
• Initiate one or more protocol executions (possibly simultaneously), and combine
(interleave) messages from one with another, so as to masquerade as some party or
carry out one of the above attacks.
• Without being able to deduce the session key itself, deceive a legitimate party
regarding the identity of the party with which it shares a key. A protocol susceptible





In this protocol an existing secure two-party authentication protocol [7]is used as a step-
ping stone for constructing a series of simple and secure key distribution protocols. The
protocols are shown to satisfy desired security requirements, using the security properties
of the underlying authentication protocol. This protocol is modular and simple.
A, B, P, Q Full principal names
S Trusted Third Party
Ek(X) Encryption of plaintext block ”X” under key ”K”
MACK(X) Message Authentication Code
Kab A and B share Key ”K”
Nab Nonce genrated by A and received by B
A⇒ B M A sends message ”M” to B
Table 3.1: Terminology used
3.1 INITIAL ASSUMPTIONS
Here it is assumed that there exists a secure two-party authentication protocol (2PA
P)[7].However, any secure nonce based 2PAP will suffice this purposes. Informally speak-
ing, a 2PAP is considered secure if and only if It is computationally difficult for an
intruder to impersonate either party. The difficulty should be equal to the strength of
the underlying cryptosystem or a strong one-way function. For example, if DES is used
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with the 2PAP in , the computational difficulty of defeating the protocol equals that of
breaking DES by brute force,which is generally believed to require on the order of 256
trials. 2PAP is as given below :
P ⇒ Q P,Npq (1)
Q⇒ P AUTHKpq(Npq, Nqp, Q), Nqp (2)
P ⇒ Q ACKKpq(Npq,Nqp, P ) (3)
AUTHKpq denotes an authentication expression based on the shared key Kpq and gener-
ated by the responding party (Q in this case). This expression is computed over three
inputs, two nonces (one generated by each party) and the name of the message origi-
nator.One example of AUTH is: E(Q ⊕ E(Nqp ⊕ E(Npq))) Similarly, ACKKpq is the
authentication expression that the initiating party sends in order to complete two-way
authentication. It is computed over the same inputs except for the message origina-
tor’s name (which Is P in this case, or can evenbe omitted). An example of ACK is:
E(Nqp ⊕ E(Npq)) .
In flow-1 ”P” genrates a nonce, which is assumed to be a good random number choosed
from a uniform distribution and assumed to be different in every protocol run. ”P” sends
Npq. ”Q” genrates its nonce Nqp. ”Q” computes authentication expression and sends
along with Nqp to ”P” in flow-2. After receving, ”P” computes authentication expression
and verifies ”Q” s authenticity. Since authentication expression is assumed to be secret
only legitimate parties can compute it. ”P” computes acknowledgement, Npp and Nqp
as seeds and sends to ”Q”. ”Q” recomputes acknowledgement and authenticates ”P”.
Since Npq and Nqp are coming in plain there is no need of decryption. Authentication
expression and acknowledgment functions are oneway hash functions. This protocol is
compact(requires minimum no.of messages). Stronger one way hash function suffices
decryption.
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3.2 2-PARTY KEY DISTRIBUTION PROTOCOL
(2PKDP)
The model for two-party key distribution [7] is such that one of the parties initiates the
protocol by requesting a new key. The other party responds by generating a new key and
shipping it back to the requester. The protocol may include a confirmation flow whereby
the initiator acknowledges the receipt of the new key. The 2PKDP is as specified below:
P ⇒ Q P,Npq (1)
Q⇒ P AUTHKpq(Npq, Nqp, Q)⊕Knew, Nqp (2)
It is a simple protocol consisting of only two messages. This protocol is much more
similar to 2PAP. ”Q” generates Knew (session key) sends to ”P”. After flow-2, ”P”
extracts the key XOR-ing the re-computed mask expression with the corresponding field
in the message. Knew is also assumed to be good random number which varies in every
protocol run. Subsequently 2PKDP can be used as a stepping stone for obtaining three-
party KDPs. However, one should not conclude that two-party key distribution, by itself,
has no applications. A 2PKDP can be used, for example, to refresh a short-term session
key between two parties (while retaining a more long-term pairwise key). Given a secure
2PAP, it is computationally difficult for an intruder (not knowing Kpq) to obtain an
AUTH expression when at least one of the nonce Npq or Nqp is selected by a legitimate
party. The AUTH expression scavenged from the secure 2PAP. Both plaintext and key are
random and unpredictable values, and therefore this can be considered a strong encryption
function. It resembles a truncated 2PAP except that the authentication expression in the
second message is used as a one-time mask for the key being distributed.
3.2.1 Security Analysis
Key Disclosure in 2PKDP can take place only if the attacker is able to obtain an AUTH
expression that safeguards a new key. The attacker has two sources of information that
can help in ”breaking” the protocol. First of all, the attacker may record any number of
legitimate executions of 2PKDP between P and Q. In this case,Npq is always under control
of ”P” and Nqp is always under control of ”Q”. Alternatively, he may try to impersonate
”P” by changing or composing a first message of the protocol and intercepting Q’s reply;
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in which case Npq is under the attacker’s control, and Nqp is selected by Q. In both cases,
at least one of the nonces: Npq, Nqp, is always under the control of a legitimate party,
i.e.,P or Q. Therefore, the ability to compute AUTHKpq(Npq, Nqp, Q) is equivalent to
breaking 2PAP.
Key Modification to a value known by the attacker is essentially equivalent to key
disclosure. If the attacker is able to modify the key to a selected value then the corre-
sponding AUTH expression simultaneously becomes known. However,since the attacker
cannot know the key apriori, he must first know the AUTH expression. This is clearly
impossible.
Key Reuse entails the attacker ”feeding” an old key to the initiating party. Note that
the attacker does not have to know the old key in order to try this attack (the simplest
attack is to use pre-recorded replies from previous 2PKDP runs). Since the attacker does
not know any old key K0, the only pieces of knowledge available to him are the recorded









where Npq is the fresh nonce generated by P in the current, protoco run and N
x
qp is a









Assuming that AUTH is based on a strong one-way function, this condition can hold only






qp which is impossible since P is assumed to generate bonafide
nonces (i.e., nonces, by definition, are never reused). Alternatively, we can analyze the
issue of replay by considering what happens if an attacker re-sends an old protocol mes-











qp, Q)⊕ K¯ = AUTHKpq(N0pq, N0qp, Q)⊕K0
K¯ is,not known to the attacker, since he can’t compute the AUTH expression masking
it. One important consequence of this result is that the attacker can, in effect, ”fool”
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the protocol initiator P into accepting just about any tuple of the form < GX , NX > as
valid reply in the second flow of the protocol. However, still the protocol achieves its goal
of distributing a random,one-time key which can only be discovered by the legitimate
protocol initiator. That is, even though the attacker can convince P to accept any value
GX as an expression masking the key, the protocol retains its strength since the key
extracted from GX remains secret.
Key Independence requires that protocol runs be unrelated. If the attacker discov-
ers K i from some protocol run (possibly via a brute force attack or some other means





qp, Q) that conceals the said key. As there is no
relationship between keys distributed in different protocol runs, knowledge of a Ki by















is negligible when pN ipq, N iqpq 6= pN jpq, N jqpq (i, j denote the different protocol runs). There-
fore, knowledge of a single session key cannot lead to the discovery of other session keys.
Key Integrity : This protocol does not provides key integrity. Key integrity is not
necessarily considered a foremost property of a secure key distribution protocol. Failure
to assure key integrity may result in the distribution to the requesting party of a key
different from the one originally issued. However, under some circumstances,this is not
problematic. The integrity of the key does not matter as long as its value does not become
known to an unauthorized party. There are also scenarios where key integrity is needed.
So far, we have made an implicit assumption that the new key is chosen uniformly by its
issuer. By uniformly we mean that, supposing that a key is an n bits long, then every
possible n-bit quantity is equally likely to be selected as a key. On the other hand, if
keys are selected in a non-uniform manner whereby each key must satisfy some particular
requirements (e.g., the RSA cryptosystem), the uniformness can not be acheived.
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3.3 3-PARTY KEY DISTRIBUTION PROTOCOL
(3PKDP)
The properties of the 2PKDP discussed so far appear reassuring. However, two party key
distribution is not a particularly useful application. A much more common scenario is
that of three-party key distribution[7]. The model for three party key distribution is that
two parties having no shared secret key enlist the assistance of a mutually trusted third
party performs the actual key distribution. This trusted third party is frequently referred
to as Authentication Server (AS) or Key Distribution Center (KDC). Each of the two
parties are assumed to share a long term key with the AS. As with 2PKDP, the goal is
to design a secure 3PKDP. The conditions for a secure 3PKDP are essentially similar to
that of 2PKDP. The only additional requirement is that a 3PKDP must be secure against
a malicious insider, i.e., a legitimate party that, by participating in legitimate runs of the
protocol,can gather enough information to impersonate other parties or otherwise abuse
the protocol(e.g., a malicious insider disclosing a key shared with another party).
3.3.1 The Protocol
A naive version of a secure 3PKDP is illustrated here. It is constructed by simply putting
together two runs of 2PKDP.
A⇒ S A,B,Nas (1)
S ⇒ A AUTHKas(Nas, Nsa, B)⊕Kab, Nsa (2)
B ⇒ S B,A,Nbs (3)
S ⇒ B AUTHKbs(Nbs, Nsb, A)⊕Kab, Nsb (4)
One notable aspect is that the key being distributed in messages 2 and 4 is one and the
same-Kab. The names of the parties involved are changed to emphasize the difference with
respect to previously discussed two-party protocols. A and B are the two principals and
S is the mutually trusted AS. The only other aspect where the present protocol differs
from 2PKDP is in the way principal names are used within AUTH tokens. Whereas
before, a name denoted the originator of a token , it now refers to the thrid party in
the protocol,e.g., the AUTH token sent from S to A includes B’s name. Similarly, the
AUTH token sent from S to B includes A’s name. This feature is necessary to prevent
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masquerading attacks whereby a malicious party tampers with the principals’ names in
message 1 of the protocol. The protocol is secure with respect to outsider attacks,i.e., a
non-participating party (i.e., not A, B or S) cannot subvert the protocol. This follows
directly from the established security of 2PKDP.
3.3.2 Insider Attacks
The new danger introduced in this 3PKDP as a result of using the same key in messages 2
and 4 are the so called insider attacks by either A or B. Both A and B, being privy to Kab
can discover each other’s AUTH expressions and try to use this new knowledge in some
malicious fashion. Knowing Kab, A (or B) can now alter B’s (or A’s)key distribution token
to any desired value. Whether or not this is a real threat depends on the requirements
specific to the local environment. The present protocol certainly fulfills the requirements
of nondisclosure, non-modification, non-reuse and independence. As long as the adversary
is an outsider. In its current state, the protocol is vulnerable to modification of Kab by
an insider (A or B). In other words, neither of the two parties can be sure that theKab
was actually issued by the AS. This exposure cannot be addressed without changing the
original 2PKDP. However, not knowing either the key or the masking expression, the
attacker can only try to play XOR-ing ”games” and factor out Kab by computing:
AUTHKas(Nas, Nsa, B)⊕Kab ⊕ AUTHKbs(Nbs, Nsb, A)⊕Kab
=AUTHKas(Nas, Nsa, B)⊕ AUTHKbs(Nbs, Nsb, A)
This expression cannot be of any value since its components remain unknown. Since the
AUTH expression is computed using Kas the only way ”X” (another insider) could try
to misuse this information is in an attempt to modify or find a key distributed to A in
a 3PKDP execution between A and some other party, say B. For such an attempt to
succeed, X needs to compute AUTHKas(Nas, Nsa, B) for a random value of Nas or Nsa.
Since X only knows expressions of the form AUTHKax(..., ..., X) and finding an expression





2-party key agreement protocols generally function by sharing a predistributed secret
between both parties for authentication.
4.1 DIFFIE-HELLMAN PROTOCOL
The Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol [10] (also called exponential key agreement)
was developed by Diffie and Hellman in 1976 and published in the ground-breaking paper
New Directions in Cryptography. The protocol allows two users to exchange a secret key
over an insecure medium without any prior secrets. A number of commercial products
employ this key exchange technique. The algorithm itself is limited to the exchange of
keys. The Diffie-Hellman algorithm [10] depends for its effectiveness on the difficulty of
computing discrete logarithms. This Protocol is based on Group theory.
• Group :
In abstract algebra, a group is a set with a binary operation that satisfies certain
axioms. For example, the set of integers with addition is a group [20]. Many of the
structures investigated in mathematics turn out to be groups. These include familiar
number systems, such as the integers, the rational numbers, the real numbers, and
the complex numbers under addition, as well as the non-zero rationals, reals, and
complex numbers, under multiplication. A group G,sometimes denoted by {G,•},is
a set of elements with a binary operation •,that associates to each ordered pair
(a,b) in G,such that following axioms are obeyed.
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(A1) Closure : If a and b belong to G,then a •b is also in G.
(A2) Associative : a •(b •c) =(a •b) •c for all a,b,c in G.
(A3)Identity Element : There is an element ”e” in G such that
a •e=e •a=a for all a in G.
(A4)Inverse Element : For each ”a” in G there is an element a 'in G such that a
•a '=a '•a=e
• Finite Group :
If a group has a finite number of elements,it is referred to as Finite Group ,and
the Order of the group is equal to the number of elments in the group. Otherwise
the group is infinite group.
• Abelian Group :
A group is said toAbelian if it satisfies all the properties of group and the fallowing
additional condition:
(A5)Commutative : a •b=b •a for all a,b in G.
The set of integers(positive,negative and zero) under addition is an abelian group.
• Cyclic Group :
A group is Cyclic if every element of G is power ak(k is an integer) of a fixed
element a ∈ G . The element ”a” is said to generate the group G, or to be a
generator of G. A cyclic group is always abelian,and may be finite or infinite.
Exponentiation with in a group as repeated application of the group operator,so
that a3=a •a •a. Furthur, a0=e,the identity element;and a−n=(a′)n. The additive
group of positive integers is an infinite cyclic group generated by the element 1.
• Rings :
A ring R,sometimes denoted by {R,+,X}, is a set of elements with two binary oper-
ations,called addition and multiplication, such that for all a,b,c in the R following
axioms are obeyed:
(A1-A5) : R is an abelian group with respect to addition;that is,R satisfies
axioms A1 to A5.For this case of an additive group we denote the identity element
as 0 and the inverse of a as -a.
(M1)Closure under multiplication : If a and b belong to R then ”ab” is also in R.
(M2)Associativity of Multiplication : a(bc)=(ab)c for all a,b,c in R
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(M3)Distributive Laws: a(b+c)=ab+ac ,(a+b)c=ac+bc for all a,b, c in R
with respect to addition and multiplication ,the set of all n-Square matrices over
the real numbers is a ring R.
A ring is said to be commutative if it satisfies the fallowing additional condition:
(M4)Commutativity of multiplication : ab=ba for all a,b in R.
Let S be the set of even integers(positive,negative and 0) under the usual operations
of addition and multiplication. S is a commutative ring.
An Integral domain ,which is a commutative ring that obeys following axioms:
(M5)Multiplicative identity : There is an element 1 in R such that a*1=1*a=a
for all a in R.
(M6)No Zero Divisors : If a,b in R and ab=0,then either a=0 or b=0.
Let S be the set of integers,positive,negative,and 0 ,under usual operations of addi-
tion and multiplication. S is an integral domain.
• Fields :
A field F, sometimes denoted by {F,+,x} ,is a set of elements with two binary op-
erations,called addition and multiplication,such that for all a,b,c in F the following
axioms are obeyed:
(A1-M6) F is an integral domain;that is, F satisfies A1 to M6.
(M7)Multiplicative inverse : For each a in F,except 0,there is an element a−1 in F
such that a(a−1)=(a−1)a=1.
In essence, a field is a set in which we can do addition, subtraction,multiplication,and
division without leaving the set. Division is defined with following rule:
a/b=a(b−1). Familiar examples of fields are the rational numbers,the real num-
bers,and the complex numbers. Set of all integers is not a field,because not every
element of the set has a multiplicative inverse. Infact only 1 and -1 have the mul-
tiplicative inverse in the integers.
• Galois Field :
Infinite fields are not of particular interest in the context of cryptography. However
finite fields play vital role in many cryptographic algorithms. Galois field is a
finite field. The finite field of order pn,where p is a prime and n is a positive
integer is generally written as GF(pn);GF stands for Galois field,in the honour of
the mathematician who first studied finite fileds. For every prime number p and
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integer n ≥ 1, there exists a finite field with pn elements. The simplest case is
when the order of the field is prime, i.e., n = 1. This finite field, GF(p). It is
a finite field with p elements, usually labelled 0, 1, 2, ... p-1, where arithmetic is
performed modulo p. It is also sometimes denoted by Zp. The simplest finite field is
GF(2). Addition in GF(2) is equivalent to the Exclusive-OR(XOR) operation,and
multiplication is equivalent to the logical AND operation.
A primitive root of a prime P is an integer g such that g(mod P) has modulo order P-1
. More generally, if GCD(g,n)=1 (g and n are relatively prime) and g is of modulo order(n) modulo n. Where (n) is the totient function, then g is a primitive root of n . The
first definition is a special case of the second since (n)=P-1 for P a prime.
for example,P=7. We have to choose a number which is relatively prime to P(i.e.
gcd(P,x)=1).Taking x=3 ,genrate allthe powers of ”x” mod P.
(31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36)mod(7)≡(3,2,6,4,5,1) .
powers of 3 generate all the integers from 1 to 6(i.e P-1) hence 3 is a primitive root of
7.Taking x=5
(51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56)mod(7)≡(5,4,6,2,3,1) .
powers of 5 generate all the integers from 1 to 6(i.e P-1) hence 5 isalso a primitive root
of 7.Taking x=2
(21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26)mod(7)≡(2,4,1,2,4,1) .
since 2 does not genrates all the integers from 1 to 6(i.e P-1) it is not a primitive root.
Algorithm for computing Primitive root:
Input : A cyclic group G of order n, and the prime factorization







OUTPUT: a generator ”g” of G.
1. Choose a random element g of G.
2. Choose i from 1 to k.
2.1 compute b   gn/pi




Two parties who wish to establish a key agree upon ”global public elements” ,”P” a
large prime no and ”g” a generator over a finite (Galois) field. Let G be a cyclic group
generated by g(primitive root of P) which is of order P. Then every element of G can be
expressed as gn, n²[1...p−1]. That is if g is a primitive root , powers of g generate all the
integers from 1 to p-1. g mod(P) ,g2mod(P ) ,g3mod(P ) ......gp−1mod(P ) are distinct
and consist of the integers from 1 through P-1 in some permutation we can find a unique
exponent ”i” such that b ≡ gi(mod P ) where 0 ≤ i ≤ (P − 1).
The exponent ”i” is refered to as the discrete logarithm, or index, of b for the base g,
mod P.
Step-1 :
A⇒ B YA= gXAmodP .
User A selects a secret XA (private) and XA ≤ P − 1.
User A computes YA= g
XA(mod P ).
A sends YA TO B.
Step-2 :
B ⇒ A YB= gXBmodP .
User B selects a secret XB (private) and XB ≤ P − 1.
User B computes YB= g
XB(mod P ).
B sends YB TO A.
B computes session key as K=(YA)
XB(mod P )
Step-3 :
A computes session key as K=(YB)
XA(mod P )
These two calculations of ”K” produce identical results:
K=Y XAB (mod P )
=(gXBmodP )XA(mod P )
=(gXB)XA(mod P )
=(gXA)XB(mod P )
=(gXAmodP )XB(mod P )
=Y XBA (mod P )
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The result is that the two sides have exchanged a secret key. Furthurmore, because XA
and XB are private,an opponent only has following ingredients to work with : P,g,YA and
YB. Thus the opponent is forced to take discrete logarithm to determine the key. The
security of Diffie-Hellman key exchange [10] lies in the fact that,while it is relatively easy
to caliculate exponentials(by repeatedly taking squares of a number) it is very difficult to
calculate discrete logarithms. For larger primes,the latter task is considered infeasible.
4.1.2 Attacks on Diffie-Hellman
Attacks against the Diffie-Hellman protocol [10] come in a few flavors. The plausibility
of these attacks depends on what assumptions we make about the adversary.
• Man in the Middle Attacks :
An active attacker (Oscar), capable of removing and adding messages, can easily
break the core DH protocol presented above. By intercepting gx and gy and replac-




respectively, Oscar (O) can fool A and B into thinking
that they share a secret key. In fact, A will think that the secret key is gx(y
1) and
B will believe that it is g(x
1)y . This is a man in the middle attack.As an example
of what can be done with such an attack, consider the case where A and B use a
shared secret key obtained in a DH protocol for symmetric encryption. Suppose A
sends a message ”m” to B and that ENCK(m) represents the symmetric encryption
(e.g. DES) of ”m” using the secret key K.
1. ”A” sends ENCgx(y1)(m). to ”B”
2. ”O” intercepts ENCgx(y1)(m) and decrypts it (which he can do since he knows
gx(y
1)).
3. ”O” replaces this message with ENCg(x1)y(m
1). which he sends to B. Note that
m1 can be set to any message.
The encryption scheme is thus clearly compromised as message privacy is violated.
In the next section, we study attacks that can be mounted by a less powerful
adversary.
• Degenerate Message Attacks :
There are degenerate cases in which the protocol does not work (i.e. it can be
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broken). For example when gx or gy equals one, the shared secret key becomes one.
Since the communication channel is public anybody can detect this anomaly. For-
tunately, this situation is impossible in a properly carried out protocol run because
both x and y are chosen from {1, . . . , p - 2} . However, an insider attack is
possible and so DH protocol participants should make sure that their key agreement
peer does not send gx = 1.
• Simple Exponents :
If one of x and y can be easily determined, the protocol can be broken. For example,
if x equals 1 then gx = g which any observant attacker will be able to detect. It is
very hard to determine where to draw the line here, that is, determining for which
values of gi, ”i” is hard to determine, since this depends entirely on the strategy of
the attacker. Any set of ”i” values could be vulnerable, depending on which values
of gi are precomputed, where the search starts, and how it proceeds. In any case,
it seems very reasonable to insist that x and y not equal 1.
• Simple Substitution Attacks :
The following attack is very interesting, as it is extremely easy to mount and nor-
mally would not come up in theoretical proofs of security. The attacker can force
the secret key to be an impossible value. If the DH protocol would only be exe-
cuted by sentient beings this would not be interesting as the anomalies would be
easily detected. However in practice DH protocols are carried out by computers
and careless implementations might not spot the following attack.
1. O intercepts gx and gy and replaces them with 1.
2. Both A and B compute the same shared secret key which equals one.
So it is safe practice to always verify that gx and gy are positive integers smaller
than p - 1 and greater than 1.
• Identity Mis-binding Attacks :
Diffie-Hellman protocol [10] does not provides authenticity. In this model any entity
can pretend like any other entity and can establish a secret a key. For example an
entity A1 may pretend like A and send a request to B. B do not have any information
to verify that whether requested party is Genuine or not. If B establishes a secret
key with A1 ,he will reveal all the secrets to him.
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• Subgroup Confinement Attack :
The generator g in the Diffie-Hellman protocol [10] is a primitive root of the prime
p, i.e. the order of the group generated by g is equal to p-1. If the selected prime
p is such that p-1 has several small prime factors, then some values between 1 and
p-1 do not generate groups of order p-1,but of subgroups of smaller orders. Hence,
within the group of order p - 1 there are subgroups of smaller orders. If the public
parameter of either A or B lies within one of these small subgroups, then the shared
secret key would be confined to that subgroup. If the order of the subgroup is small
enough, the intruder may launch a brute force attack to determine the exact value
of the shared secret key.
Example :
Let p = 19 and g = 2.
Then the group generated by g is
(2, 4, 8, 16, 13, 7, 14, 9, 18, 17, 15, 11, 3, 6, 12, 5, 10, 1)
Now, Let k = 2(secret key of first party), A = 22 = 4
Subgroup generated by A = SA = (4, 16, 7, 9, 17, 11, 6, 5, 1)
Let l = 3(secret key of second party), B = 23 = 8
Sub-group generated by B = SB = (8, 7, 18, 11, 12, 1)
Kab = 26(mod 19) = 7
It can be clearly seen from the example above that the shared secret key Kab lies
in the intersection of the subgroups generated by k and l. The Solution to counter
this kind of an attack is to choose a Safe Prime. Safe primes are prime numbers
of the form p = 2q + 1 where q is prime. Such primes have various cryptographic
advantages.
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4.1.3 Results And Discussion
SOURCE PROGRAM













G[xa]mod P is forwarded to destination
*****************************************************************************





























G[xb]mod P is forwarded to source
*****************************************************************************




In this protocol one can easily observe from results that neither of the two parties
can alone decide the key completely. Both parties collaborate and constitute session key
without revealing their secret information. This protocol lacks entity authentication.
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4.2 ENCRYPTED KEY EXCHANGE PROTOCOL
This protocol allows two parties sharing a password to establish a secret key. The En-
crypted Key Exchange(hereafter referred to as simply EKE)[5] presents a novel and ele-
gant method of key establishment.
4.2.1 Generic EKE
The ’generic’ version of EKE is illustrated below:
A⇒ B A,P (Ea) (1)
B ⇒ A P (Ea(K)) (2)
A⇒ B K(Ca) (3)
B ⇒ A K(Ca, Cb) (4)
A⇒ B K(Cb) (5)
The protocol begins with A generating a random key-pair (Ea, Da) of some public
key encryption scheme. Then, A sends to B the encryption of Ea under the password P
(a weak shared secret). B generates a new session key, K, encrypts it with Ea, super-
encrypts the result with P, and forwards it back to A. The remainder of the protocol -
flows 3, 4, and 5 - represent standard hand-shaking that follows key distribution. A gen-
erates a challenge Ca and encrypts it with K and send to B. B decrypts it and generates
its own challenge Cb . B encrypts and sends back both Ca and Cb to A. A decrypts it and
verifies received value of Ca with sent value and confirms that B posses same key as A.
A encrypts Cb and sends back to B. B decrypts it and verifies received value of Cb with
sent value and confirms that A posses same key as B.
Attacks on Generic EKE:
The generic EKE [5]protocol is susceptible to the type of attack that, for lack of better
term, we shall call Denning-Sacco Attack [11] or DS for short. The attack proceeds as
follows:
The attacker manages to obtain one of the session keys used in one run of a key distri-
bution protocol. Armed with that knowledge, the attacker is then able to impersonate one
of the parties indefinitely often.
The attacker somehow obtains one of the session keys distributed in one (recorded) run
of EKE. Armed with that knowledge, the attacker mounts a dictionary attack on the
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password and, upon breaking the password, is able to impersonate one of the parties
indefinitely.
In more detail, the DS attack is as follows:
• The attacker records one run of generic EKE and somehow obtains the key K.
• Iterating upon all possible choices of ”P” :
1. Pick a candidate P
2. ComputeEa = P
−1
(P (Ea))whereP (Ea) is taken from flow 1 of the recorded
run.
3. Compute Ea(K) (only if Ea is a valid key)
4. Compute P (Ea(K)) and compare it to P (Ea(K)) from recorded flow 2.
A match in the last step indicates correct guess of the password and earns the
attacker carte blanche with respect to impersonating A.
4.2.2 EKE with Diffie-Hellman key exchange
The Exponential Key Exchange (EKE) variant (referred to as EKE-DH from here on) is
illustrated below. EKE-DH appears to be the most practical EKE variant because of the
relative simplicity of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange[10]. Here it is assumed that both
A and B agree upon Diffie-Hellman parameters, g(genrator of cyclic group) and p(large
prime no.)
A⇒ B A,P (Ra) (1)
B ⇒ A P (Rb), K(Cb) (2)
A⇒ B K(Ca, Cb) (3)
B ⇒ A K(Ca) (4)
In step-1, A picks a random number ”ra” and calculates Ra = g
ra(mod p). Note that
name is sent in the clear. Ra is encrypted with shared password(P) between A and B.
A,P(Ra) is sent to B
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In step-2 B picks a random number ”rb” and calculates Rb = g
rb(mod p). B also uses the
shared password P to decrypt P[Ra ] and calculates g
(ra)(rb)(mod p) like in Diffie-Hellman
protocol[10]. The session key K is derived from this value, perhaps by selecting certain
bits. Finally, a random challenge Cb is generated.Cb is encrypted with K. P(Rb),K(Cb) is
sent to A.
In step-3 A uses P to decrypt P[Rb] and calculates g
(rb)(ra)(mod p) . From this, K is cal-
culated; it in turn is used to decrypt K [Cb]. A then generates her own random challenge
Ca. Both Ca and Cb are encrypted with K and sent to B.
In step-4 B decrypts and verifies that Cb is proper. B encrypts Ca with K and sends
to A. A verifies genuineness of Ca.






















g[ra]mod P is forwarded to destination
********************************************************************
































k[ca,cb] is forwarded to Destination
********************************************************************






Received [Ca] after decryption: 1174












Received g.[ra] mod P from source


















































K[Ca] is forwarded to source
************************************************************************
This protocol provides entity authentication. Both parties encrypt their data using
shared password. This protocol also provides key confirmation. Sharing a secret between
every two parties is almost impossible in large environment. Unlike generic EKE, DH-
EKE does not suffers from dictionary attacks.
4.3 SAKA PROTOCOL
Simple Autheticated Key Agreement Protocol [1] called SAKA is simple and cost effective.
SAKA has less number of steps and less computation cost. Password based mechanism
is used for user autentication. This is a 2-party key agreement protocol. This protocol is
based on Diffie-Hellman key agreement[10],Easy generalization.
4.3.1 The Protocol
A and B(system pricipals) are assumed to share the weak secret(password) pw in a se-
cure way. They agree upon the generator g and its group Z∗p . x and y are selected in
Z∗p for a uniform distribution, and X = g
x(mod P ) and Y = gy(mod P ) are also in Z∗p
for a uniform distribution. The session key is made byh(gxymod P ). The protocol run as
follows.
1.A⇒ B X ⊕ pw
A chooses a random number x, computes X = gx(mod P ), and encrypts it with pw send
to B. After receiving message 1, B recovers X by using the password pw. Then, B chooses
a random number y, computes Y = gy(mod P ) and Key2 = X
y(mod P ) = gxy(mod P )
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like in Diffie-Hellma protocol[10]. B encrypts Y with pw. B also computes one way hash
h( ) using X,Key2 as parameters. B sends Y ⊕ pw||h(Key2, X) to A.
2.B ⇒ A Y ⊕ pw||h(Key2, X)
After receiving message- 2, A recovers Y by using the password pw and computes
Key1 = Y
x(mod P ) = gxy(mod P ). A also computes one way hash h( ) using X,Key1
as parameters and verifies that h(Key1, X) = h(Key2, X). If they match each other, A
confirms that Key2 is valid and both parties posses same key. It also suggests that X is
not tampered in transit and Y is from valid source(B) i.e. it authenticates B. Then, A
computes the response data h(Key1, Y ) and sends it to Bob.
3.A⇒ B h(Key1, Y )
B computes h(Key2, Y ) and verifies h(Key1, Y ) = h(Key2, Y ). If they match each other,
B confirms that Key1 is valid and both parties posses same key. It also suggests that Y
is not tampered in transit and X is from valid source(A) i.e. it authenticates A.
Finally, A and B agree on the common session key K = h(Key1) = h(Key2) =
h(gxymod p).
4.3.2 Security Analysis
SAKA protocol [1] is based on computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) [10] problem, which
states that computing gxy(mod P ) giving gx(mod P ) and gy(mod P ) is hard. SAKA [1]
also satisfies completeness property i.e. if each party’s messages are faithfully relayed
to one another, then the parties succeed in authentication and key agreement, at least
with overwhelming probability. Adversaries cannot not be accepted by the principals
without knowing the password. Off-line password guessing attack succeeds when there
are pieces of information in communications which can be used to verify the correctness
of the guessed passwords. In the SAKA protocol, a passive attacker , all he receives from
the protocol is as follows: X ⊕ pw,Y ⊕ pw,h(Key1, Y ),h(Key2, X). He first guesses a
password pw1 and finds gx
1
= X ⊕ pw ⊕ pw1and gy1 = X ⊕ pw ⊕ pw1. If he wants to
verify his guess, he has to find Key1 or Key2 which is impossible.
Since x and y are selected in the cyclic group for a uniform distribution, we can see
that X and Y remain on the cyclic group under uniform distribution, and X ⊕ pw and
Y ⊕ pw also remain on the cyclic group under uniform distribution. There is no way to
find the relationship between the rejected password and the remaining password.on-line
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trial on password cannot partition out the possible set. The partitioning implies that the
possible set decreases logarithmically. If an adversary tries to masquerade B and defraud
A, she can know gx⊕pw sent from A and y, gy,gy⊕pw1 by herself where pw1 is a guessed
password. It is helpless since there is not any verifiable data. That means, he can not
carry out the off-line guessing attacks. To continue, he has to reply h(Key2, X) data.
Which is not possible since he cannot find out Key2.




















G[xa]mod P is forwarded to destination
*****************************************************************************
Received Hash Code : 380258010








Received hash value from DestinationH(GXY,GX) :380258010
Computed Hash value:H(GXY,GX) 380258010
Received Hash value is proper.
*****************************************************************************
HASH:H(GXY,GY) : 352721330
H(GXY,GY) is forwarded to Destination
*****************************************************************************
Final Key agreed Upon:H(G(x,y)) 1592155219
DESTINATION PROGRAM



























NEW HASHH(GXY,GX) : 380258010




G(xb)mod P is forwarded to source
**************************************************************************
COMPUTED HASH:H(GXY,GY) 352721330
Received HashH(Gxy,Gy) Value : 352721330
Final Key agreed Upon:H(G(x,y)) 1592155219
SAKA provides entity authentication by shared passwords. This protocol is optimal 2-
party key agreement protocol as it takes minimum no.of steps and random nubers. Both
the parties encrypt the data using shared secret. It is secure against dictionary attacks
as there is no verifiable information present. One can observe from results that one way






This protocol was proposed by Steiner, Tsudik and Waidners [13]. Password-based mech-
anism is the widely used method for authentication since it allows people to choose their
own passwords without any assistant device to generate or store. However,people are
used to choose easy-to-remember passwords such that guessing attacks could succeed.
This is a 3-party key agreement protocol. All parties (clients) share their secrets with
a trusted server only. This protocol is more suitable for large communication environ-
ments. From the form of passwords stored in the second party (B), there are two types
of protocols,plaintext-equivalent protocols in which the clear form of the first party’s
(A) password is stored in B, and verifier-based protocols in which the verifier that is
easily computed from the password, yet deriving the password from the verifier is com-
putationally infeasible, is stored in B. The verifier-based protocol has the advantage
that a compromised verifier does not reveal the password directly. However, a compro-
mised verifier of a weak password also suffers from the guessing attack. Additionally, the
verifier-based protocol has more computational overheads than the plaintext-equivalent
protocol. Thus, a secure plaintext-equivalent protocol is suitable and necessary if we can
not confine people to choose and remember strong passwords.
From the session key creation point, such protocols can be classified into two types:
key transport protocols in which the session key is created by one party and securely
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transmitted to the other party, and key agreement protocols in which both parties con-
tribute information for creating the resultant session key. The latter is fairer and more
secure than the former since in the latter no one can fully control the session key, while
the former is suitable for some special environments. In key transport type of three-party
protocols,the session key is created by the server S instead of one of the two communica-
tion parties. This will result in the worry that a malicious server can get all transaction
contents. In most applications we only need the server to be an authentication server
but not to be a monitor center (except some special needs, e.g. national defense). In
key agreement type of three-party protocols, the session key contributed from A, B and
S needs more computational cost than it contributed from A and B, moreover, it is still
unknown to the server S.
Steiner, Tsudik, and Waidner proposed a three-party EKE protocol (hereafter referred
to as STW 3-Party EKE) [13] and declared that it performed the following tasks:
• Secure distribution of session key K to A and B.
• Mutual authentication of A and B.
• (Indirect) authentication of S to A and S to B.
5.1.1 The Protocol
Every host shares a secret(password) with trusted third party denoted by P. They agree
upon Diffie-Hellman [10] parameter set g(generator),p(large prime number)
STW 3-party EKE is as given below:
1.A⇒ B [RA ⊕B]PA
A chooses a random exponent NA, keeps it secret and computes RA=g
NA(mod p). Then,A
encrypts [RA ⊕ B] with his password PA and sends the encrypted message as a request
to B. After receiving A’s request, B also chooses a random exponent NB, keeps it secret,
computes RB=g
NB(mod p), then encrypts [RB ⊕ A] with PB . B forwards A’s request
with the encrypted message to S.
2.B ⇒ S A, [RA ⊕B]PA , [RB ⊕ A]PB
S decrypts [RA⊕B]PA , [RB⊕A]PB with PA and PB respectively and responses RNSA , RNSB
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to B, in which NS is a random exponent S chose.
3.S ⇒ B RNSA , RNSB
B computes the session key K = (RNSA )
NB=gNA.NB .NS(mod p) and sends RNSB with a key
confirmation message [flow1]K to A.
4.B ⇒ A RNSB ,[flow1]K
A computes the session key K = (RNSB )
NA=gNA.NB .NS(mod p). A decrypts [Flow1]K with
session key ”K” and checks Flow-1 equals [RA⊕B]PA to confirm that B posses the same
session key K. A re-encrypts [Flow1]K with the session key K and responses it to B for
key confirmation.
5.A⇒ B [[Flow1]K ]K
B decrypts [[flow1]K ]K with the session key K and checks [Flow1]K to confirm that A
posses the same session key K.
5.1.2 Undetectable on-line guessing attacks
An attacker attempts to use a guessed password in an online transaction. He verifies
the correctness of his guess using responses of S. If his guess fails he must start a new
transaction with S using another guessed password. A failed guess can not be detected
and logged by S, as S is not able to depart an honest request from a malicious request.
This can be demonstrated in two scenarios. In these two scenarios, the attacker B, who is
valid but malicious, completes the protocol with S and no participation of A is required.
Scenario 1 :
1. B: records [RA ⊕B]PA
The attacker B records [RA ⊕B]PA of an arbitrary run of the protocol. He guesses
a password PA and computes the value RA. He sets RB=RA and encrypts RA ⊕A
with his password PB. Then, he sends S the message A,[RA ⊕B]PA ,[RA ⊕ A]PB .
2. B ⇒ S A, [RA ⊕B]PA , [RA ⊕ A]PB
S decrypts [RA ⊕ B]PA , [RA ⊕ A]PB with PA and PB respectively and responses
RNSA ,R
NS
A to B, in which Ns is a random exponent S chose.
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3. S ⇒ B RNSA , R
NS
A
The attacker B compares the two values. If RNSA = R
NS
A and so he has guessed the
correct password PA = PA
Scenario 2 :
1. B: [RA ⊕B]PA
The attacker B guesses a password PA generates on behalf of A a random expo-
nent NA and computes RA = g
NA(modP ). Then, B encrypts [RA ⊕ B] with the
guessed password PA. Additionally, B chooses a random exponent NB computes
RB = g
NB(modP ) and encrypts [RB ⊕A] with his password PB. Then, he sends S
the message A,[RA ⊕B]PA ,[RB ⊕ A]PB
2. B ⇒ S A, [RA ⊕B]PA , [RB ⊕ A]PB
S decrypts [RA⊕B]PA , [RB⊕A]PB with PA and PB respectively and responses RNSA ,
RNSB to B. in which NS is a random exponent S chose.
3. S ⇒ B RNSA , RNSB
The attacker B computes the two values (RNSA )
NB and (RNSB )
NA . If they are equal,
it follows that he has guessed the correct password PA = PA
5.2 LSH 3-PEKE PROTOCOL
This protocol was proposed by Chun-Li Lin, Hung-Min Sun and Tzonelih Hwang [2].
This protocol is secure against both the off-line guessing attack and undetectable on-line
guessing attacks [14] but also satisfies the security properties of perfect forward secrecy
. The most important requirement to prevent undetectable on-line guessing attacks is
to provide authentication of A and B to S(server). In step 2 of the STW 3-Party EKE,
the message [RA ⊕ B]PA , [RB ⊕ A]PB doesn’t contain any verifiable information for S to
authenticate A and B eventhough S uses correct passwords to decrypt that message. On
the contrary, if there is any verifiable information for S combined with password PA and
PB, it will result in off-line guessing attacks. One solution for this problem is by means
of the help of server S’s public key. Assuming that S’s public key is a cryptographic
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parameter which is secure against guessing and exhaustive attacks, and is well-known
for all parties. Therefore, any verifiable information with a confounder encrypted with
S’s public key is able to withstand off-line guessing attacks. Based on such idea, a new
three-party EKE protocol was proposed which is secure against both off-line guessing
attacks and undetectable on-line guessing attacks [14].
5.2.1 The Protocol
The LSH 3-PEKE is described below:
1. A⇒ B A, {ra,RA, PA}Ks
A chooses a confounder ”ra” and a random exponent NA, keeps them secret and
computes RA = g
NA(mod P ). Then, A encrypts ra, RA, PA with server’s public key
Ks and sends the encrypted message as a request to B. After receiving A’s request,
B also chooses a confounder ”rb” and a random exponent NB, keeps them secret,
computes RB = g
NB(mod P ) then encrypts rb, RB, PB with server’s public key Ks.
B forwards A’s request with the encrypted message to S.
2. B ⇒ S A, {ra,RA, PA}Ks , {rb, RB, PB}Ks
S decrypts {ra,RA, PA}Ks , {rb, RB, PB}Ks with his private key and authenticates A
and B by verifying their passwords PA and PB respectively. Then, S encrypts B,
RB with ”ra”, encrypts A, RA with ”rb” and responses them to B. Notice that the
values ”ra” and ”rb” also act as one-time keys.
3. S ⇒ B [B,RB]ra, [A,RA]rb
B decrypts [A,RA]rb with ”rb” and authenticates S by verifying the integrity of ID
A. B computes the session key K=RNBA (mod P ) and sends [B,RB]ra with a key-
confirmation message [f(flow1), CB]K to A.
4. B ⇒ A [B,RB]ra, [f(flow1), CB]K
A decrypts [B,RB]ra with ”ra” and authenticates S by verifying the integrity of
ID B. A computes the session key K=RNAB (mod P ) decrypts [f(flow1), CB]K with
the session key K and checks f(flow1)? = f(A, {ra,RA, PA}Ks) to confirm that B
possessed the same session key K. Then, A responses CB to B for key confirmation.
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5. A⇒ B CB
B checks CB to confirm that A possessed the same session key K.














Public key Pair of server : 349427 , 732349
Private key Pair of server :23 ,732349
***********************************************************************
Received PKT- II B −→ S [A,ra,RA,PAKS,rb,RB,PBKS]































PASSWORD OF SOURCE A : 1007
PASSWORD OF DESTINATION B : 1109
SOURCE PASS WORD MATCHED











PKT-3 S −→ B : [B,RB]ra,[A,RA]rb TO DESTINATION DISPATCH
************************************************************************
SOURCE PROGRAM










ENTER YOUR IDENTITY : A
CONFOUNDER GENARATED : 7499
ENTER PUBLIC KEY [e,n] OF SERVER : 349427 732349






ENTER UR PWD : 1007
Encrypted PWD : 593246
A, {ra,RA, PA}KS FORWARDED TO DESTINATION
***********************************************************************


































Received Pkt1.[A, {ra,RA, PA}KS] from source
**********************************************************************
CONFOUNDER GENARATED : 2543
ENTER UR ID : B
ENTER PUBLIC KEY [e,n] OF SERVER : 349427 732349
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ENTER UR PWD : 1109
Encrypted PWD : 235976
PKT- II B −→ S [A, {ra,RA, PA}KS, {rb, RB, PB}KS] DISPATCHED
***********************************************************************



























PKT- IV B −→ A [B,RB]ra,[f(flow1),CB] DISPATCHED
Received CB:26584557
Received CB frm source is proper
This protocol uses public key infrastructure. Here RSA algorithm is used for this
purpose. In the first two steps of protocol all the data are encrypted using server public
key using RSA algorithm. This protocol provides key confirmation also in last two steps.






A new 3-party key agreement protocol is proposed which withstands all online and off-
line guessing attacks ,which does not makes use of public key infrastructure. Several
key agreement protocols are proposed on password based mechanism. These protocols
are vulnerable to dictionary attacks. Storing clear text version of password on server
is always not possible. In this protocol we use a trusted third party (key Distribution
server) which mediates in key distribution. Rather than storing clear text version of
password we store one way hash of the password at the server. Every host and server
agree upon family of commutative hash functions using which host authenticates itself
to server when it applies for session key . During this protocol run host establishes one
time key with server using which server also authenticates to host. Moreover we don’t
use any public key infrastructure which needs large computational power. Since this is
3-party key agreement protocol every host need not share secret information with every
other host.
6.1 THE PROTOCOL
Before we proceed we define one way hash function:
A one-way function is a function f such that for each x in the domain of f, it is easy to
compute f(x), but for essentially all y in the range of f, it is computationally infeasible
to find any x such that y = f(x).
The protocol is as described below:
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1. A⇒ S A ,B ,H(PA)[RA]
A chooses a random no. ”ra” and generates RA = g
ra(mod P ) like in Diffie-Hellman
protocol [10] where ”g” is a generator of cyclic group and ”P” is a large prime. It
also generates one way hash of its password H(PA). A encrypts RA with H(PA)
and sends it to server along with ID s of participating entities. Server stores one
way hash of password of every host (assumed to be pre distributed) using which it
decrypts the above packet to get RA = g
ra(mod P ).
2. S ⇒ A H(PA)(grs1mod P ), H(PB)(grs2mod P )
Server chooses random nos. rs1 and rs2. ”S” generates g
rs1(mod P ) and grs2(mod P )
respectively. Using these quantities server establishes ephemeral keys with A and
B respectively. Using this ephemeral keys ”S” authenticates itself to ”A” and ”B”.





Note that KBS can be computed only after fourth step of the protocol.
grs1(mod P ) and grs2(mod P ) are encrypted with H(PA) and H(PB) respectively
and dispatched to ”A”. A decrypts this packet with H(PA)
3. A⇒ B FA(PA, KAS) , H(PB)(grs2mod P )
A decrypts this packet with H(PA) to get g
rs1(mod P ) . ”A” establishes ephemeral
key with ”S” as KAS = (g
rs1)ramod P . ”A” calculates its predicate function
FA(PA, KAS) using which it authenticates itself to server. Since only ”A” knows PA
only it can compute this predicate function. This is a commutative one way hash
function .
This value along with H(PB)(g
rs2mod P ) is forwarded to ”B”. B decrypts with
H(PB) to get (g
rs2mod P )
4. B ⇒ S FA(PA, KAS), FB(PB, KBS), H(PB)[RB]
”B”chooses a random no. ”rb” and generates RB = g
rb(mod P ) . It also gener-
ates one way hash of its password H(PB). ”B” computes ephemeral key for au-
thenticating server as KBS = (g
rs2)rbmod P . ”B” calculates its predicate function
FB(PB, KBS) using which it authenticates itself to server. This predicate function
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is a commutative one way hash function. Password of B and ephemeral session key
KBS are seeds for this function. Since only ”B” knows PB only it can compute this
predicate function. After receiving this packet server decrypts with H(PB) to get
RB. Server computes ephemeral one time session key KBS = (g
rb)rs2mod P . using
this KAS,KBS server authenticates itself to hosts. KAS,KBS changes with every
protocol run. Server recomputes predicate functions of A and B i.e. FA( ),FB( )
and authenticates A and B respectively.
Server need not know PA to compute this predicate function. Since this is a
commutative hash function and H(PA) is pre distributed, using KAS, H(PA) server
can calculate the predicate function FA( ) and authenticates A. Similarly using
KBS, H(PB) server can calculate the predicate function FB( ) and authenticates B.
5. S ⇒ B fKAS(RB), fKBS(RA), HKAS(RA, RB), HKBS(RA, RB)
”S” encrypts RB and RA with KAS and KBS respectively. This defeats identity
mis-binding attacks.f( )is a cryptographic transformation function.”S” computes
one way hash functionHKAS(RA, RB) using KAS(one time key shared between A
and server)using this host-A authenticates the server. Similarly ”S” computes one
way hash function HKBS(RA, RB) using KBS(one time key shared between B and
server)using this host-B authenticates the server.
fKAS(RB), fKBS(RA), HKAS(RA, RB), HKBS(RA, RB) are sent to B. After receiving
this B decrypts fKBS(RA) with KBS and gets RA. Since KBS is shared between
server and B,it ensures B that RA value is from authentic source. B recomputes one
way hash HKBS(RA, RB) using KBS as key and authenticates server. B computes
session key with A as KAB = (RA)
rb(mod P ) like in Diffie-Hellman protocol [10].
6. B ⇒ A fKAS(RB), HKAS(RA, RB), HKAB(NAB), NAB
B forwards fKAS(RB), HKAS to A. A decrypts fKAS(RB) using KAS to get RB.
Since KAS is shared between server and A, it ensures A that RB value is from
authentic source. A computes session key with B as KAB = (RB)
ra(mod P ) like
in Diffie-Hellman protocol [10]. B also computes a one way HKAB(NAB) using
KAB and NAB as seeds. Where NAB is a random number. This one way hash is
used for key confirmation(assures that both parties posses same session key). Since
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NAB is transmitted in plain there is no need of decryption. One way hash suffices
decryption.
7. A⇒ B HKAB(HKAB(NAB))
Using KAB and NAB A recomputes one way hash HKAB(NAB) and verifies that
B posses same key, KAB as A. Using KAB A once again calculates one way hash
HKAB(HKAB(NAB)) and sends to B. After receiving this B recomputes this one way
hash using KAB and verifies that A posses same session key(KAB) as B.
6.2 COMMUTATIVE ONE-WAYHASH FUNCTIONS
Both host and server agree upon family of commutative hash functions {H0, H1, H2, .......Hn}
. Let H (P) be defined asH0(P ), a member of a family of Commutative one-way hash func-
tions. Host A calculates one way hash of its password as H0(PA) = P
h0
A (mod P ),where h0
is a random number(which it kepps as secret). We assume that one way hash of password
H0(P ) of every host is distributed to server. Since one way hash is irreversable nobody





Server Knows only one way hash of password PA i.e. H0(PA) using which it calculates





Here KAS is one time (ephemeral) key established between server and A. Since server
knows KAS and H0(PA) it can compute this predicate function and authenticate A.
Similarly it computes predicate function for B and authenticates B. Since these are
commutative hash functions HKAS(H0(PA)) = H0(HKAS(PA)) i.e. (P
KAS
A )




Proposed protocol extends Two party version SAKA [1] to 3-party protocol. Every host
need not share a secret with every other host. Since all the transactions in the protocol
are done using one way hash of the password, host need not store clear text version of
its password at server and it defeats dictionary attacks. Since this is a one way hash
function there is no way to recover P from H(P). Every time host and server establish a
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one time(ephemeral) key using which host authenticates server. Unlike traditional 3-party
key agreement protocol we need not use long term(master) keys which leads to malacious
insider attacks. In malicious insider attacks one of the participating parties turns hostile
and misuse the information it has acquired in previous protocol runs and breaks the
system. Server authenticates hosts using predicate functions. For calculating predicate
functions server need not know password of hosts. Server can calculate predicate function
using one way hash of the password of the hosts.
Even though H(P ) is compromised (under some rare circumstances) nobody can mimic
the host to server as only legitimate hosts can compute predicate functions . Because host
only knows its password which is a seed for predicate function. Nobody can mimic the
server to the host even ifH(P ) is compromised. It is equivalent to breaking Diffie-Hellman
problem[10]. ”S” encrypts RB and RA with KAS and KBS (one time ephemeral keys)
respectively. This defeats identity mis-binding or masquerading attacks. Here the server
acts just like authentication server not as monitoring server. This prevents malicious
server from knowing session key and subsequently knowing all transactions. This protocol
also ensures key integrity, key non disclosure, and key confirmation. Proposed protocol
also ensures perfect forward key secrecy. Even if one of the session keys are compromised
it will not lead to disclose of future keys. This protocol sustains online and off-line
guessing attacks as there is no verifiable information present.


















































































VALID SOURCE : A












PKT-5 ( Fkas(RB),Hkas,Fkbs(RA),Hkbs) DISPATCHED
SOURCE PROGRAM










ENTER YOUR IDENTITY : A
ENTER DESTINATION IDENTITY : B
ENTER YOUR PASSWORD : 454545435234354545
*******************************************************************
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Dispatched Pkt-1 to Server
*********************************************************************
Received packet -2 H(Pa) (g.pow(rs1)),H(Pb) (g.pow(rs2)) from Server



















PKT-3 H(Pa)(g.pow(rs2)),Fa(Pa,Kas) DISPATCHED TO DESTN
**********************************************************************






SERVER VERIFIED ::::VALID SERVER::::::
*********************************************************************





key conformation message Received from Destn. H(KAB,NAB) : 858699223
key conformation message computed by source H(KAB,NAB) : 858699223
KEY CONFIRMATION FROM SOURCE SIDE ENDS:::::VALID KEY
key conformation message to Destn. H(H(KAB,NAB)) : 602588964
PKT-7 key conformatio message H(H(KAB,NAB)): DISPATCHED TO DESTN
KEY ESTABLISHMENT ACCOMPLISHED
DESTINATION PROGRAM











ENTER UR ID : B
ENTER DESTINATION IDENTITY : A
ENTER YOUR PASSWORD : 3434343324434
































PKT-4 FA(PA,KAs), Fb(Pb,Kbs) ,H(PB)(RB) DISPATCHED TO SERVER.
***********************************************************************










SERVER VERIFIED ::::VALID SERVER::::::
***********************************************************************





GENRATED NONCE(NAB) : 5256
key conformation message to source H(KAB,NAB) : 858699223
PKT-6 Fkas(RB),Hkbs(RB,RA), H(KAB,RA) DISPATCHED TO SOURCE
***********************************************************************
key conformation message computed by Destn. H(H(KAB,NAB)) : 602588964
PKT-7 H(H(KAB,NAB)) RECEIVED FROM SOURCE
key conformation message from source H(H(KAB,NAB)) : 602588964
Received H(H(KAB,NAB)): is proper
KEY CONFIRMATION FROM DESTINATION SIDE ENDS:::::VALID KEY
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One way hash of the password of host is stored at server. The data sent to server is
encrypted using this one way hash. Predicate function is calculated using commutative
hash functions using password as seed at client side and one way hash of the password
at server. Host authenticates Server using one way hash computed using RB and RA
as seeds. Key confirmation is provided through one way hash using session key and a
random no. as seeds. Inclusion of random no. widens the key space in case of dictionary
attacks. Encryption of RB and RA using one time keys provides user authentication. It





Strength of any crypto system relies upon strength of the encryption/decryption algo-
rithm and strength of Key distribution mechanism. Frequent key changes are must in-
order to minimize the amount of data compromised. Several applications demand throw
away session keys especially financial applications. In traditional 2-party key distribution
protocol every host should share a secret with every other host. 2-party key distribu-
tion protocol is not a particularly useful application but it can be used as a stepping
stone for 3-party key distribution protocol . In 3PKDP every host need not share a
secret with every other host. This greately simplifies the number of masters keys to be
distributed. Every host shares a master key with Key Distribution centre(KDC). But
3PKDP(traditional) is vulnerable to insider attacks. In 3PKDP server genrates a session
key and distributes to both parties,i.e. Server also knows the session key and it can mon-
itor every transaction between two hosts. Which is a big problem in case of malacious
servers.In most of the applications we want authentication server but not a monitoring
server(except very few applicatons like national defense).
Diffe-Hellma Protocol [10]solves these problems. One of the advantages of using Diffie-
Hellman key exchange [10] is its inherent ”democracy” - both parties contribute equally
to the resultant key without revealing their secrets. This and the relative simplicity of
implementation make it quite attractive and practical to implement, especially in low end
environments such as smartcards. Diffie-Hellman protocol [10] is vulnerable to several
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attacks. It is obviously important to choose a group (i.e. P) large enough so that the
best known algorithms for computing discrete logs are intractable. To defeat Man -in-the
middle attack secret keys can be used in conjunction with message authentication codes.
Generic EKE [5] version is proved to be vulnerable to cryptanalysis . Unlike generic
EKE, EKE-based on Diife-Hellman appears to be resistant to the dictionary attacks. Its
resistance is due to the fact that the key is never communicated in any way. Instead,
only residues are communicated in encrypted form. Even if the attacker obtains both
residues, he does not come closer to discovering Key. Conversely, if the attacker somehow
discovers Key, he cannot validate correct guesses of RB and RA thus making a dictionary
attack impossible. Users sole means of authentication and sole long-term storage is a
simple Password, rather than a bulky private key. EKE, required that both parties have
clear text versions of the shared password, a constraint that cannot (or ought not) always
be met. In particular, consider the problem of a user logging in to a computer that does
not rely on a secure key server for authentication. It is inadvisable for most hosts to
store passwords in either clear form or in a reversibly-encrypted form. EKE is 2-party
key agreement protocol. Since every pair of hosts have to share a password,this limits
its practical applications. In large communication environments, it is inconvenient in key
management that every two communication parties mutually share a secret.
STW protocol is three party EKE protocol. Password based mechanism is the widely
used method for authentication. Since STW protocol is 3-party protocol every host shares
a password only with server. It is also based on Diffe-Hellman protocol. It is vulnerable
to undetectable on-line password guessing attacks and off-line password guessing attacks
[14]. Among the two classes of attacks, the off-line password guessing attack is the most
comfortable and promising one for an attacker. It is also not noticed and has no com-
munication cost. Comparing with off-line guessing attacks, undetectable on-line guessing
attacks are much expensive due to the communication cost. Furthermore, undetectable
on-line guessing attacks will probably fail if too many attempts notice a sensitive server.
LSH 3PEKE protocol [2] is immune to on-line guessing attacks, the off-line guessing
attacks [14]. The off-line guessing attack will not work because nothing is encrypted by
passwords. The only appearance of the password is the message encrypted with S’s public
key. Since the password is confounded with a confounder that is a sufficiently large ran-
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dom number, the amount of guessing to verify the ciphertext is a half of the multiplication
of the confounder space and the password guessing space on average. It is computational
infeasible. Another way to get the password is direct to crack S’s private key. It is also
computational infeasible. In step 2 of protocol, S decrypts {ra,RA, PA}Ks , {rb, RB, PB}Ks
by his private key and verifies the correctness of passwords PA and PB to authenticates
A and B. Thus, undetectable online guessing attacks also will not work. Although at the
moment S can not confirm the freshness of the request, the following responses encrypted
by the one-time keys ra and rb are able to guarantee the mutual authentication and the
freshness to A and B. This protocol satisfies the property of perfect forward secrecy . It
also satisfies the property of known-key security because the ephemeral random expo-
nents NA and NB are independent among every protocol run.LSH 3-Party EKE protocol
[2] uses server public keys for key exchange. Using public key infrastructure is inadvis-
able in key agreement as it needs extensive computaional power.However, the approach
of using server public-keys is not always a satisfactory solution and is impractical for
some environments. Communication parties have to obtain and verify the public-key of
the server, a task which puts a high burden on the user. In fact, key distribution services
without public-keys are quite often superior in practice than PKIs or are at least widely
deployed.
User authentication is one of the most important security services in secure communi-
cations. It is necessary to verify the identities of the communication parties before they
start a new connection. SAKA [1] protocol is a 2-party key agreement protocol which
provides user authentication based on shared secret(password). This protocol is simple
and efficient. It is secure against on-line and off-line guessing attacks. Since it is a 2-party
protocol its applications are limited.
In proposed protocol public key infrastructure is not used. Since this is a 3-party
protocol every host need not share a secret with other host. Proposed protocol pro-
vides host authentication and server authentication as a result man-in-the middle at-
tacks are averted. It also spoils online and off-line guessing attacks as it uses one time
keys,commutative hash functions for authentication. Hosts are not forced to store clear
text version of password. Proposed protocol ensures perfect forward key secrecy ,key
integrity. Proposed protocol also sustains malacious insider attacks as we use one time
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keys for authentication. Server acts just like authentication server not like a monitoring
server. Proposed protocol provides key confirmation also.
Future work
Proposed protocol can be extended to group key agreement protocol in distributed sys-
tems. Another possible optimization is to encrypt predicate functions FA( ),FB( ) with
one time ephemeral keys KAS, KBS respectively. This will furthur strengthen the proto-
col against dictionary attacks [12]. Key confirmation(last two messages in protocol) can
also be acheived through blind signature. But for that we have to use again public key
infrastructure. During key confirmation step we may omit the random number but it
opens up scope for known plain text attacks.
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